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This paper reviews three arguments why government should not directly finance public 
goods provision in the countryside: (1) sorting and voting of residents leads to efficient 
local public goods provision, (2) community governance better copes with incomplete 
contracting in public goods, and (3) public provision drives out voluntary private provi-
sion of public goods. Theory and empirical evidence partly support these arguments. 
The adequate level of rural governance appears to be often below the national or Euro-
pean level, and policy should focus on the institutional premises of public goods provi-
sion rather than on centralized payments to public good providers. 
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A review of arguments 
1 Introduction 
Economists widely agree that the provision of public goods is a justification for govern-
ment action. According to the orthodox view, the allocation of public goods, because they 
exhibit non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption, cannot optimally be achieved by 
a decentralized market system and therefore requires some sort of policy mechanism 
(SAMUELSON, 1954). Recent reform of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) with its gradual phasing-out of direct market intervention and an emphasis on ‘mul-
tifunctionality’ has led to a re-focusing on the role of government in providing public 
goods in the countryside. Whereas the policy implications of largely environmental exter-
nal effects of farming have been an issue since the 1980s (HODGE, 1991), the principal role 
of government in setting a favorable framework for the various dimensions of rural devel-
opment has only more recently received renewed attention. For example, one of the gen-
eral recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Board at the German Federal Ministry of 
Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture concerning the establishment of the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) was that in the long term the Euro-
pean Commission should strictly limit ‘rural development’-intervention to the financial 
support of public goods provision (WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT, 2005). 
But should the Commission really finance public goods provision in rural areas? And if 
yes, how should this be done? Recent research in public and institutional economics has 
improved the understanding of how the fundamental incentive, information and coordina-
   1 tion problems inherent to public goods provision could potentially be addressed by public 
policy. In particular, the interplay between individual motivations to contribute to public 
goods and the appropriate level and extent of government activity has been a focus of in-
terest. The aim of this paper is to review these insights, to ask which lessons can be learned 
for the formation of rural development policy, and to identify areas for further research on 
decentralized public goods provision in rural areas. 
In the rest of the paper, I examine three arguments why a central government should not 
directly finance the provision of public goods in the countryside:  
(1)  sorting and voting of residents leads to a locally organized provision of public goods 
that reflects the true preferences of the residents,  
(2)  community governance is a more effective way to cope with the incomplete informa-
tion and enforcement problems inherent in public goods provision, and  
(3)  public provision drives out voluntary private provision of public goods.  
I thus gradually move from the central government via the local community to the individ-
ual in order to explore whether these levels are better suited to provide public goods. To set 
the stage for the analysis, I present a taxonomy of public goods relevant to rural areas in 
the following section 2. Section 3 reviews some of the literature related to the three argu-
ments and asks how it may inform rural development policy in Europe. Section 4 con-
cludes. 
2 2  A taxonomy of public goods in rural areas 
In the recent literature on public goods provision it has been argued that the traditional cri-
teria characterizing public goods, namely non-rivalry and non-excludability, can and 
should be regarded as matters of degree (CORNES and SANDLER, 1996: 51-63).  
Table 1:  A taxonomy of public goods relevant for rural development 
  Non-rival Congestible  Rival 
Non-excludable  Pure public goods 
–  Landscape (non-use value) 
–  Natural habitat (non-use 
value) 
–  Biodiversity (non-use value) 
 
Open access resources 
–  Landscape (use value by visitors) 
–  Recreation value (use value by visitors) 
Excludable only to 
outsiders of a ju-
risdiction or com-
munity  
Local pure public goods 
–  Positive image as an attractive 
place to live and work (‘qual-
ity of life’) 
–  Effective local governance 
institutions 
–  Low local tax levels 
–  Absence of unemployment 
–  High levels of human and so-
cial capital 
–  Landscape (use by residents) 
–  Natural resource protection 
 
Common property resources 
–  Groundwater recharge 
–  Irrigation systems 
–  Natural habitat 
–  Biodiversity 
 
Excludable  Toll goods/spite goods 
–  Natural habitat  
–  Biodiversity  
Club goods 
–  Natural habitat  
–  Biodiversity 
 
Private goods 
–  Regionally labelled 
products and services 
–  Historical places, e.g. 
buildings 
 
Source: modified and extended from OECD (2001: 80). 
Table 1 presents a taxonomy of public goods based on the idea that benefits may be ex-
cludable only to outsiders of a community or locality and that an intermediate stage be-
tween non-rivalry and full rivalry in consumption may be described as congestion, imply-
ing positive crowding costs. In addition to the polar cases of pure public goods and private 
goods, this gives rise to five additional groups of impure public goods. Classifying goods 
as local pure public goods acknowledges that they are public only to the residents of a lo-
cal jurisdiction. Because rurality has an important spatial dimension, many rural public 
   3 goods are of a local nature. These include a positive public image of the region or locality, 
effective local governance institutions, low local taxes, and to a large degree also high lev-
els of employment, human and social capital. Natural amenities are local public goods if 
there exist access barriers to non-residents. Only if these (local) goods are valued without 
being actively used (hence have a ‘non-use value’) do they exhibit characteristics of a 
(global) pure public good. For open access and common property resources, also called 
‘common-pool resources’ by OSTROM (e.g., 2005: 79), it is either impossible or costly to 
exclude users once the resource is provided by nature or created by humans, although there 
is rivalry in consumption. Examples include recreation in rural areas or groundwater re-
sources. Toll or spite goods impose an exclusion restriction on users although there is no 
rivalry. This applies to a non-congested national park where access is restricted by a user 
fee. Club goods are characterized by a particular institutional arrangement involving volun-
tary membership and user fees, where positive crowding costs determine an optimal club 
size and goods provision level to each member (CORNES and SANDLER, 1996: 347-351). 
Some country clubs belong to this category. 
As the subsequent analysis will show, varying degrees of publicness give rise to different 
forms of policy response. Often, the appropriateness of central government action will be 
questionable, and sometimes purely private arrangements appear to be the desirable solu-
tion. However, this brief discussion also shows that it may not always be possible to ex-
actly classify certain public goods or services, and that goods may exhibit various degrees 
of excludability or rivalry, depending on which group of consumers is considered. 
4 3  Why central government should not directly finance rural public goods provision 
3.1  Sorting and voting of residents leads to efficient local public goods provision  
TIEBOUT (1956) introduced the idea that local public goods could be provided efficiently 
by a decentralized system of jurisdictions which compete for residents by offering specific 
public goods/tax level packages. Contrary to SAMUELSON (1954), this view maintains that 
there indeed does exist a market-like pricing mechanism in which “spatial mobility pro-
vides the local public-goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip” (TIEBOUT, 
1956: 422). In this model, local taxes have the same function as prices in a market, and 
mobile households, by ‘voting-with-the-feet’, make residential choices for public goods 
and the costs of services they consume according to their preferences (OATES and 
SCHWAB, 1999). Jurisdictions in the Tiebout-model may also be interpreted as offering a 
specific, homogenous club good (CORNES and SANDLER, 1996: 365-369). As Table 1 re-
veals, many public goods in rural areas are local in nature or of a club type, so that the Tie-
bout-model may be of direct relevance.  
There is a vast and ongoing debate in the literature exploring whether and how ‘Tiebout-
sorting’ could be consistently modeled, whether it can be empirically borne out and 
whether it indeed has desirable normative properties. According to ROSS and YINGER 
(1999), there has been particular dissent on how local public goods levels are determined 
given that residents have sorted into communities, an aspect that was treated only lightly 
by TIEBOUT (1956). Key problems in understanding these processes are the diversity of 
public choice mechanisms, the way how local taxes provide funding for public goods and 
its implications for housing and rental markets, and the technology of public goods produc-
   5 tion. As a consequence, models of endogenous community choice and public service pro-
vision have been scarce. 
In a survey of the empirical literature on Tiebout-sorting, DOWDING et al. (1994) list sev-
eral testable implications of the model and show that many of them tend to be supported by 
the evidence. In particular, tax/service packages of alternative localities seem to have em-
pirical relevance for moving decisions. This view has recently been contested by RHODE 
and STRUMPF (2003), who argue that other motives for residential choice are dominant in 
their investigation of long-term moving trends in the US. 
Normative analysis has focused on the question whether the efficiency claims made by 
Tiebout could indeed be confirmed in a formal General-Equilibrium framework. As ROSS 
and YINGER (1999) and various other authors show, the assumptions to be made for a 
Pareto-efficient sorting and voting outcome are very strong and often do not match empiri-
cal evidence. Among the major sources of inefficiency are the ‘misallocation’ of house-
holds to communities because it is impossible to devise an allocatively neutral, uniform 
head-tax. Furthermore, an inefficient level of local public goods provision may result from 
property taxes and the capitalization of public goods in land prices, as well as from local 
policy processes that do not represent the interests of the citizens. In addition, it has been 
noted that Tiebout-sorting leads to significant differences in incomes and taxbases between 
jurisdictions, which might make redistributional policies on a higher level of government 
desirable (WELLISCH, 2000). 
Despite these shortcomings, the Tiebout-hypothesis has provided several stimulating in-
sights and its efficiency perspective has had much appeal to economists. Related to the re-
cent discussion of constitutional reform in the European Union, FREY and EICHENBERGER 
(1999) have proposed a ‘New Democratic Federalism for Europe’ that is directly inspired 
6 by the Tiebout-hypothesis. They propose to establish political bodies whose size and spa-
tial extension corresponds to the public goods they provide. These bodies are called ‘Func-
tional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ)’ and are characterized by four 
properties (p. 4):  
(1)  A single jurisdiction is determined by the function to be fulfilled, i.e., its size has to 
match its task.  
(2)  Each function requires a corresponding geographical extension, which leads to an 
overlap of bodies.  
(3)  FOCJ compete for communes and citizens and they are subject to democratic politi-
cal competition, e.g., via popular referenda. 
(4)  FOCJ are jurisdictions with the power to raise taxes to fund their activities.  
According to FREY and EICHENBERGER, FOCJ emerge because they are desired by the citi-
zens and can be controlled and monitored by them. Contrary to the Tiebout-model, the ex-
tension of jurisdictions is not taken as a given. But similar to TIEBOUT, the authors rely on 
the idea that most public goods are local and non-payers can be excluded. FOCJ are aimed 
to introduce a fifth freedom (beyond free mobility of goods, services, labour and capital), 
namely to choose membership in a FOCJ. The major expected benefit of such a system is a 
more efficient provision of public goods and services, because increased exit and entry op-
tions foster competition between FOCJ and induce innovative behavior, flexible sizes al-
low the exploitation of scale economies, and direct democratic control inhibits political 
rent seeking. 
Although it seems unlikely that FOCJ can be an immediate template for political reform on 
the EU or national level, the proposal illustrates the crucial importance of the institutional 
dimension of public goods provision. DE SPINDLER (2001), by drawing on experience with 
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many. He stresses the need for a greater variety of public bodies which focus on specific 
tasks, obtain the power to tax, and are subjected to direct democratic control. Above all, he 
recommends a stronger devolution of the financial competencies of administrative bodies. 
Similar proposals are made by WELLISCH (2000: 194-199), in particular with regard to 
strengthening the tax autonomy of local governments. 
There is a considerable literature on rural in-migration due to consumptive preferences of 
residents (‘counterurbanisation’) in human geography and rural planning (see, e.g., BOYLE 
and HALFACREE, 1998). Economists, however, seem to have paid little attention to the in-
terplay between residential decisions and public goods provision in European rural areas 
(but see DELLER et al., 2001, and LEWIS et al., 2002, for empirical studies on the United 
States). A number of researchers have begun to analyze the possibilities for decentralizing 
agri-environmental policies in Germany (EGGERS et al., 2004; ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG, 
2000). One outstanding finding of these studies is the stark discrepancy between the spatial 
extension and relevance of the public good on the one hand, which is usually local, and the 
funding competence for its provision on the other hand, which is on the national or Euro-
pean level. EGGERS et al. (2004: 25) also point out that EU regulations do not provide for 
legal decision making competence beyond the Länder (i.e., state) level, which appears still 
much too centralized for many problems. The authors of ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG (2000: 
84) conclude that a fundamental redistribution of competencies within the German federal 
system will be required to achieve a more efficient provision of environmental goods. 
In summary, the literature demonstrates how intriguing the analogy is between the compe-
tition for residents among local jurisdictions and the conventional market mechanism. Al-
though the strong normative implications of this model hold only under partly implausible 
8 or empirically challenged theoretical assumptions, its general idea has led to a number of 
policy recommendations. Among the most important is that the local provision of public 
goods can be a desirable arrangement if administrative devolution is accompanied by a 
strengthened tax autonomy and sufficient control rights for local citizens. 
3.2  Community governance is an efficient way to cope with incomplete information 
and enforcement problems 
Many environmental resources are public in the sense that users cannot be excluded from 
consuming them, whereas the limited availability of the resource may at the same time lead 
to congestion and rivalry. This coordination problem lies at the heart of environmental and 
resource policy and applies to the open access and common property resources listed in 
Table 1. Economists have modeled it as a ‘prisoners’dilemma’, in which overexploitation 
of the resource or underprovision of the public good is the Pareto-inferior equilibrium 
strategy (for a recent overview of the literature see BOWLES, 2004: 127-166). Traditional 
proposals to avoid coordination failure include privatization of the resource, leading to a 
market-based allocation, and state intervention via legal regulation or taxation. However, 
these two coordination mechanisms are subject to important limitations: market allocation 
may work poorly in the presence of technological non-excludabilities or when contracts are 
incomplete and difficult to enforce, e.g., due to information asymmetries. State regulation 
faces similar information problems and imperfect public choice mechanisms may lead to 
rent-seeking and a lack of accountability. Moreover, shifts between property regimes may 
entail difficult decisions about equitable property right assignments. For these reasons, 
communities as a third form of governance have received increasing attention from social 
scientists (BALAND and PLATTEAU, 1996; WESTHOLM et al., 1999; AOKI and HAYAMI, 
2001).  
   9 Based on extensive field studies and literature review, OSTROM (2005) has provided a list 
of attributes of resources and appropriators in successful self-governing associations. Many 
of these support the underlying hypothesis of the economic literature that “decentralization 
to communities is favored where complete contracting is precluded but where low levels of 
conflict of interest within the community and other aspects of community structure facili-
tate the transmission of private information and mutual monitoring among community 
members” (BOWLES, 2004: 493). In particular, OSTROM (2005: 244-245) found that com-
munity governance tends to be viable if: 
(R1)  resource conditions allow feasible improvements,  
(R2)  reliable indicators on the condition of the resource system exist,  
(R3)  resource unit flows are predictable, and  
(R4)  the spatial extent of the resource is small.  
Moreover, favorable conditions exist when: 
(A1)  the resource represents a high economic, social or religious value for appropriators,  
(A2)  appropriators have a common understanding of the workings of the resource system,  
(A3)  they display a low discount rate in relation to future benefits from the resource,  
(A4)  community interaction is characterized by trust and reciprocity,  
(A5)  appropriators are autonomous from external authorities and  
(A6) possess prior skills of organization and leadership.  
On the other hand, she identified the following threats to sustainable community govern-
ance (p. 272):  
(1)  rapid exogenous changes,  
10 (2)  intergenerational transmission failures with regard to the operational principles on 
which community governance is based,  
(3)  relying on blueprint thinking combined with easy access to external funds,  
(4)  corruption and other forms of opportunistic behavior, and  
(5)  the absence of large-scale institutional arrangements related to information collec-
tion, processing, and dissemination; fair and low cost conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms; educational and extension facilities; and safety-net arrangements when natural 
or other major disasters occur at a local level. 
THEESFELD (2004) analyzed a Bulgarian irrigation area where the threats indeed dominated 
the conditions for community-based management of water. She gives several reasons why 
local self-governance has not been successful. First, individual water users behaved oppor-
tunistically by deliberately misusing the uncertain water appropriation rules that emerged 
in the Bulgarian transition process. Moreover, information policies of the local elite con-
cerning the formation of water user associations were highly selective and intransparent. 
Both of these resulted in high levels of distrust and envy among the local population. Rein-
forced by the pace of transition and partly unsuitable arrangements imposed from outside, 
opportunistic behavior of single individuals apparently destroyed any existing trust and re-
ciprocity on which successful collective action was dependent. 
A positive example comes from a local development association in Northwestern Poland. 
This region is endowed with national parks and an attractive landscape, but affected by 
high levels of structural unemployment due to the dismantling of former state-farms and a 
military base. GRAMZOW (2006) traced the success of a local public-private partnership, 
which developed the recreational potential of the region by creating a bike trek, established 
a brand mark for regional products and services, and offers workshops in arts and crafts to 
   11 the local population. This led to a number of business start-ups, increased numbers of tour-
ists, and a strengthened self-image of the region. According to the author, the success of 
the association critically rested in the close cooperation between the local government and 
a private association, the active participation of local inhabitants, and the engagement of a 
respected and trusted leader. A number of differences to the Bulgarian case stand out: the 
level of conflict of interest was lower, because the partnership concentrated on the provi-
sion of local pure public goods rather than congestible common property resources, and it 
utilized a range of institutional complementarities between community, local government, 
and market-based approaches to public goods provision. 
In summary, there are serious theoretical arguments and empirical evidence why local ap-
proaches may be well-suited to address local coordination problems in rural public good 
provision. However, not always are conditions conducive to such attempts, and community 
governance might be in need of being complemented by state and market arrangements. 
3.3  Public provision drives out voluntary private provision of public goods 
Recent experimental evidence has widely supported the view that individuals value their 
personal contribution to a public good (ANDREONI, 1993). This is an important modifica-
tion of the traditional assumption of purely self-interested behavior in economics and also 
different to what has been called ‘pure altruism’, where the individual values only the 
overall level of the public good. The so-called ‘warm-glow’ model takes into account that 
the level of one’s own contribution to the public good, for example in the form of giving 
away time or money, plays an important role (ANDREONI, 2005). This insight raises a 
number of policy question pertinent to the topic of this paper: How is individual provision 
of public goods affected by government provision? Will there be crowding-out? Which 
policy instruments stimulate private contributions? 
12 Given warm-glow preferences, PAYNE (1998) found that an additional dollar of govern-
ment grants to US charitable organizations crowds out private donations to these organiza-
tions by about 50 cents. This can be taken as evidence that givers regard their tax-financed 
donations as a partial substitute for voluntary donation. Likewise, private organizations 
that provide public goods were found to significantly reduce their fundraising activities if 
they receive government grants (ANDREONI and PAYNE, 2003). This has led researchers to 
examine the relation between income taxation and voluntary giving based on warm-glow 
preferences (DIAMOND, 2006). 
On a more fundamental level, economists have begun to ask how institutions and policies 
induce or evoke preferences and behavior, a major step beyond the traditional assumption 
of exogenous and stable preferences (for an overview see BOWLES, 2004: 93-126). FREY 
(1997) has put forward the hypothesis that “a constitution for knaves crowds out civic vir-
tues”. In other words, imprudent governance may destroy the existing individual willing-
ness to contribute to public goods. Based on insights from social psychology, FREY (1997: 
1044-1045) argues that a ‘hidden cost of reward’ appears when an external reward reduces 
individuals’ intrinsic incentives to undertake an activity for its own sake. According to the 
author, two kinds of processes lead to such behavior:  
(1)  Individuals reduce the motivational factor under their control when they perceive the 
external intervention to be ‘controlling’ in the sense of limiting the extent to which 
they can determine actions by themselves, and  
(2)  an external intervention undermines intrinsic incentives if it carries the notion that 
the actor’s intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged.  
The individual feels that his competence is not appreciated which in turn impairs his self-
esteem. For example, there is empirical evidence that offering financial compensation by a 
   13 governmental agency reduces individuals’ willingness to contribute to a public good. FREY 
hence maintains that external regulations or commands but also rewards can impair intrin-
sic motivation. However, they can also crowd-in intrinsic motivation if they are perceived 
to be supporting, prevent free-riding of others, or establish fairness and equity. 
Relatively little is known about how these processes affect the voluntary provision of the 
particular public goods in rural areas described in the previous chapter. Based on farm-
level data from Pennsylvania field crop producers, WEAVER (1996) estimated models ex-
plaining environmental effort, including conservation tillage, management of excess ma-
nure and animal waste management. The author did not implement a warm-glow specifica-
tion, but tested the somewhat polar cases of an ‘egoistic hedonist’, who only values his 
own contribution to the public good, and a ‘pure altruist’, who is only interested in the 
overall level of the public good, against a model of a ‘selfish hedonist’ with no preferences 
for the public good at all. WEAVER finds that individual profit motives strongly influence 
environmental effort, but also that “substantial evidence points to the importance of egois-
tic and altruistic motivation as a determinant of environmental effort” (p. 245). He inter-
prets this environmental effort as private giving to a public good. Related to this finding is 
the evidence cited by DURAND (2003: 139), who describes French farmers’ motives for 
adopting a specific environmentally friendly stewardship scheme as being related to farm-
ers’ perception of their “function in society” and not only to “rational economic calcula-
tions”.  
In addition, a number of studies show that the successors of former state-farms in transition 
countries intentionally maintain high employment levels on their farms and actively en-
gage in social and cultural activities, even for many years and despite economic pressure to 
rationalize production (see BIESOLD, 2004, for Ukraine, and CURTISS et al., 2006, for the 
14 Czech Republic). One interpretation of this is that private provision of public goods in ru-
ral areas may arise spontaneously and persistently, if central government supply of vital 
goods and services is interrupted. 
Researchers have paid increasing attention to the voluntary group formation by farmers 
and other stakeholders to address environmental problems in rural areas (OECD, 1997; 
HAGEDORN, 2002), a phenomenon related to community governance described in the pre-
vious section. Examples from Australia and The Netherlands comprise spontaneously 
formed, community-based associations such as land-care groups, conservation clubs, or 
environmental cooperatives. According to OECD (1997: 88), the motives for group forma-
tion include concerns about declining farm profitability, an increasing awareness of links 
between ecological and financial sustainability, and a fear of central imposition of regula-
tions combined with confidence in self-regulatory capacity (described as “taking ‘owner-
ship’ of issues”). The authors of the latter study point out that a policy environment that as-
sures adequate returns to farming through direct market intervention or generous disaster 
relief may discourage private initiative to ensure sustainable farming practices. 
In summary, there is evidence that individuals are willing to contribute voluntarily to the 
provision of public goods in rural areas. However, this seems likely to be discouraged not 
only by ‘command and control’-regulation, but also as a result of generous compensation 
by a central (and distant) authority. On the other hand, if issues are locally important and 
the required individual level of contribution is not too high, spontaneous private solutions 
may emerge.  
   15 4 Conclusions 
Based on the previous review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, two major 
conclusions emerge from the analysis: 
(1)  Adequate governance to stimulate public goods provision in rural areas appears to be 
often located below the national or European level. 
(2)  An appropriate policy should focus on the institutional premises of public goods pro-
vision in rural areas rather than on centralized payments to public good providers. 
The survey has shown that promising decentralized allocation mechanisms exist for the en-
tire spectrum of rural public goods depicted in Table 1. Centralized arrangements often 
lack the information necessary for effective policy design, create problems of monitoring 
and enforcement, may crowd-out individual initiative and fail to utilize the relatively incor-
ruptible allocation mechanism of competition. Efficiency-oriented policy-making will 
therefore require a careful analysis of the specific characteristics of a certain public good, 
such as its spatial extension and the potential conflicts of interests between users, and 
should rely on principles of institutionalised competition and incentive-compatible self-
regulation at the appropriate level (PETRICK, 2005).  
However, decentralized arrangements do not work in all situations. Central government 
has a comparative advantage in producing rules that compel individuals to interact coop-
eratively if other arrangements fail. Furthermore, it can implement redistributive policies 
more effectively to meet fairness standards that market-based or other decentralized ar-
rangements cannot achieve. Finally, if jointness in production precludes to address each 
public good at the optimal territorial scale, or if spillovers in the form of spatial positive or 
negative externalities are significant, there may be a role for central government coordina-
tion. 
16 After all, the question is not whether the state should provide public goods or not, but how 
complementarities between different institutional arrangements, notably various layers of 
government, market and community, can be combined best to achieve this end (BOWLES, 
2004: 487; HODGE, 2001, makes this point for rural environmental governance). Against 
this background, the European Community Initiative ‘Leader’ has offered a new perspec-
tive on rural development policy (EUROPEAN  COMMISSION, 2000). Its ‘Local Action 
Groups’ (LAG’s) are based on regional partnerships between governmental and private ac-
tors in order to create local development strategies by using local capabilities. Their decen-
tralized management is financially supported by a system of global grants, while being 
embedded in a European network of development associations (WESTHOLM et al. 1999: 
188). LAG’s thus combine governance elements of competition (among LAG’s for grants 
and among regions more generally), community (by utilizing the advantages of local par-
ticipation and co-operation), and state (by involving representatives of local governments). 
Widely positive experience with ‘Leader’ in the EU-15 suggests that this may be an effec-
tive governance mechanism for rural development in Europe that is fundamentally differ-
ent from traditional top-down approaches. 
One purpose of the previous literature review was to identify research gaps concerning de-
centralized rural governance. Questions to be addressed in the future include how impor-
tant rural amenities and other public goods are for residential choice and how residential 
decisions affect public goods provision in rural areas, which rural public goods are best 
suited for community governance, how charitable and environmental organizations affect 
public goods provision in rural areas, under which conditions individuals are willing to 
contribute voluntarily to these goods, and how policy could optimally support this. 
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